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Abstract
Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models of the macro-
economy assume that labor is traded in a spot market. Two exceptions
by David Andolfatto and Monika Merz combine a two-sided search
model with a one-sector real business cycle model. These hybrid mod-
els are successful, in some dimensions, but they cannot account for
observed volatility in unemployment and vacancies. Following sug-
gestions by Robert Hall and Robert Shimer, this paper shows that a
relatively standard DSGE model with sticky wages can account for
these facts. Using a second-order approximation to the policy func-
tion we simulate moments of an arti￿cial economy with and without
sticky wages and we document the dependence of unemployment and
vacancy volatility on two key parameters; the disutility of e⁄ort and
the degree of wage stickiness. We compute the welfare costs of the
sticky wage equilibrium and ￿nd them to be small.
1 Introduction
Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) of the macro-
economy are built around a spot market for labor. Two exceptions, Andol-
fatto [2] and Merz [17], combine the two-sided search model of Mortensen
￿This research was supported by NSF grant SBR 0418174. The authors wish to thank
Stephanie Schmitt GrohØ and Mart￿n Uribe for helpful and extensive comments on an
earlier draft. We also wish to thank participants at the NBER summer institute in 2005
and seminar particiapnts at Duke University and the University of British Columbia.
1and Pissarides [21], [20], [22] with a one-sector real business cycle model.
These hybrid models are successful in some dimensions at explaining how
unemployment and vacancies move over the business cycle but they cannot
account for observed volatility in unemployment and vacancies. This paper
shows that a DSGE model with rigid wages can account for these facts.
Shimer [25] suggests that the problem with search theoretic models is that
they are typically closed with a Nash bargaining solution. Nash bargaining,
as a wage-setting mechanism, allows too much wage ￿ exibility relative to
the data. Hall [10], [11] has explored Shimer￿ s suggestion that models with
rigid or partially adjusting wages may be more successful than ￿ exible wage
economies at explaining the facts. This paper builds on the Hall-Shimer
approach by constructing a fully speci￿ed dynamic general equilibrium model
and studying the properties of alternative wage determination mechanisms.
We construct a version of a real business cycle model in which we add
a two-sided matching technology similar to those studied by Andolfatto and
Merz. We use this arti￿cial economy to study the properties of three alterna-
tive equilibria. In the ￿rst, the wage is chosen to mimic the social planning
solution: We call this a ￿ exible wage economy. In the second equilibrium
the real wage grows at the rate of underlying technological progress but is
unresponsive to current productivity shocks. We call this the rigid wage so-
lution. Finally, we study an economy in which the real wage adjusts 19% of
the way towards the e¢ cient solution in every quarter. We call this a sticky
wage economy.
In the context of the Mortensen-Pissarides model, Hagedorn and Manovskii
[9] have shown that the Hall-Shimer volatility puzzle can be solved by choos-
ing a high value for the outside option of the worker. Although our model of
the labor market is embedded into a fully speci￿ed DSGE environment we
￿nd that a disutility of e⁄ort parameter, related to Hagedorn and Manovskii￿ s
outside option, plays an important role in in￿ uencing unemployment and va-
cancy volatility. We are not, however, able to resolve the Hall-Shimer puzzle
with this parameter alone. Since our model allows for variable search inten-
sity we ￿nd that the social planning optimum has counterfactual implications
for the Beveridge curve. In order to generate the observed negative corre-
lation between unemployment and vacancies and simultaneously to generate
the magnitude of unemployment and vacancy volatility observed in the data
we need to choose the disutility of e⁄ort and the degree of wage stickiness
together.
Since we need sticky wages to explain the data it seems reasonable to ask
2if the welfare cost of failing to adjust the real wage is large. Using a second
order approximation to the utility function we ￿nd that when wages adjust
19% of the way to their optimal value in each period that the welfare cost
relative to the ￿rst best is roughly 40 cents per person per quarter in terms
of foregone consumption. It seems likely that a cost of this magnitude could
be explained by menu costs.
To summarize; our paper makes three contributions to existing literature.
The ￿rst is the ￿nding that a sticky wage DSGE economy does a good job of
explaining the time series properties of unemployment and vacancies in the
U.S. Second, to resolve the Hall-Shimer volatility puzzle in a DSGE model
with variable search intensity we need both sticky wages and the ability
to pick the reservation wage. Finally we ￿nd the welfare costs of the sticky
wage equilibrium are small. Hence we are able to show that the main features
of the Hall-Shimer sticky wage equilibrium continue to hold in a standard
production economy with risk averse consumers and capital accumulation
whilst preserving the ability of the standard RBC model to explain other
features of the data.
2 Related Literature
In the Andolfatto [2] and Merz [17] models, unemployment and vacancies
enter di⁄erently into the social objective function since vacancies use units
of commodities but unemployment uses labor as an input. In the model de-
veloped below we have made them symmetric (unemployment and vacancies
both impose a time cost) to emphasize a stark implication of the RBC model.
In the social planning solution both vacancies and unemployment should be
procyclical.1 Our reason for modifying the Adolfatto-Merz approach is that
their models have di¢ culty in explaining the volatility and cyclical properties
of unemployment and vacancies. This problem was documented in U.K. data
by Millard, Scott and Sensier [18] and in U.S. data by Shimer [25] who points
out that when search models are closed with a Nash bargaining solution, they
deliver counterfactual labor market predictions.
1In order to generate negatively correlated unemployment and vacancies, both Mertz
and Andolfatto study versions of their respective models in which search intensity by
workers is ￿xed. Merz studies a version of her model with variable search intensity in which
she ￿nds (Merz [17] Table 3 page 282) that unemployment and vacancies are positively
correlated.
3We are not the only people currently working on the problem of com-
bining search with an RBC model and closely related papers include those
by Blanchard and Gal￿ [4], Costain and Reiter [5], Gertler and Trigari [8],
den Haan, Ramey Watson [6], Fujita and Ramey [7], Hall [12] and Veracierto
[27]. Although our model is di⁄erent in some respects from those studied
by each of these authors our ￿ndings are complementary. Like Blanchard
and Gal￿ [4], Gertler and Trigari [8] and Hall [12], we study the e⁄ects of
closing the model with a sticky wage although we do not attempt to provide
a microfoundation for this assumption as in Menzio [16]. Instead, we adopt
Moen￿ s [19] approach of competitive search equilibrium in which competitive
market makers announce the wage at which ￿rms and workers must agree if
search is to take place at their location.
In Moen￿ s work competition between market makers enforces a ￿rst best
equilibrium. In our view this assumption is strong and the process by which
a competitive wage is established is likely to take time. If one identi￿es
the competitive market maker of Moen with the Walrasian auctioneer, our
approach is one where the auctioneer has been removed and replaced either
by a ￿xed or slowly adjusting wage; hence the title of our paper ￿ shooting
the auctioneer.￿
3 The Social Planning Problem
In this section we describe an arti￿cial economy that adapts the standard
one-sector real-business-cycle model by adding a search technology for mov-
ing labor between leisure and productive activities. We solve for the social
planning optimum and show how the model with unemployment and vacan-
cies is related to a standard environment with a spot market for labor.
3.1 Setting up the social planning problem












￿ b(Ut + Vt)
￿
:
The ￿rst term in the square bracket represents the utility of consumption
which we take to be logarithmic. The second term represents the disutility
4of working in market activity and the third is the utility cost of searching for
a job. The cost of search has two components; Ut is time spent searching by
a worker for a job, and Vt is time spent by the representative family in its
role as an employer searching for workers.
The stock of employment evolves according to the expression
Lt = (1 ￿ ￿L)Lt￿1 + Mt; (1)
where we assume that matches separate exogenously at rate ￿L. The term
Mt = B (Ut)
￿ (Vt)
1￿￿ (2)
is the matching function which we take to be Cobb-Douglas with weight ￿.
The problem is constrained by a sequence of capital accumulation con-
straints,
Kt+1 = Kt (1 ￿ ￿K) + Yt ￿ Ct; t = 1:::;
and by a production function,






Output, Yt is produced using labor Lt and capital Kt which depreciates at
rate ￿K: The term (1 + g)
t measures exogenous technological progress and At
is an autocorrelated productivity shock which follows the stationary process
At = A
￿
t￿1 exp("t); 0 < ￿ < 1;
Et￿1 ("t) = 0:
We assume that f"tg
1
t=1 is a Markov process with bounded support and we






The assumption of bounded support is required in Section 5 in which we
compute a second order approximation to the policy function.
53.2 Solving the social planning problem
The social planner can alter the stock of workers in productive activities
by varying the time spent searching for jobs by workers or the time spent
searching by ￿rms for workers. Since the stock of labor can only be in-
creased by hiring, the inclusion of employment as a state variable adds an
additional propagation mechanism for shocks. Although this mechanism is
potentially important, in practice the separation rate from ￿rms is so high
that the contribution of this additional component is not large and in our cal-
ibrated model most movements in employment at business cycle frequencies
are caused by variations in time spent searching by ￿rms or by workers2.
To model the movements in unemployment and vacancies that would be
observed in an e¢ cient allocation we solve the social planning problem. To
move labor into and out of productive activity the planner chooses contingent
sequences fUt ("t);Vt ("t)g. The ￿rst-order conditions for the choice of these








￿t = b; (5)
where ￿t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the labor accumulation constraint







We de￿ne ’t = Vt=Ut to be labor market tightness since when ’t is high
there are many ￿rms looking for workers but few workers searching for jobs.
From a planning perspective, there is an optimal level of tightness and the
most e¢ cient way to increase the labor stock Lt is to increase unemployment
and vacancies together. If the data were generated by a social planning
solution one would expect to observe that movements in Ut are perfectly
correlated with movements in Vt.
2Shimer [25] cites data from Abowd and Zellner [1] and from the Job Openings and
Labor Turnover Survey, to argue that separations occur at a rate of approximately 10%
per quarter in the U.S. data. This is a big number - it implies that 40% of the labor force
separates from employment in a year.
6A consequence of constant labor market tightness is that ￿t, the shadow
price of increasing the stock of labor, is also constant. By the de￿nition of












￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿: (6)
By moving Ut and Vt together the social planner maintains a constant mar-
ginal utility cost of creating new matches.



















t = ￿t ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿L)Et [￿t+1]:






















which is closely related to the static optimizing condition for labor that arises
from a standard RBC model. The parameter ￿ drives a wedge between the
marginal product of labor and the disutility of employment and as ￿ ! 0,
Equation (8) converges to the familiar ￿rst order condition for labor in the
one-sector RBC model. For small values of ￿, the time paths of capital,
gdp, consumption and hours are close to the solutions obtained from an
RBC economy with a spot market for labor.
The parameter ￿ is key to our discussion below of the ability of this model
to replicate unemployment dynamics. Although our model is richer than the
standard search model studied by Hagedorn and Manovskii [9], ￿ plays the
same role as the reservation wage in their environment. In a search model
with Nash bargaining, ￿ would place a lower bound on the wage that the ￿rm
could o⁄er. We will return to the role of ￿ later in the paper when we discuss
its interaction with wage stickiness in helping to generate the Beveridge curve
and simultaneously to generate realistic unemployment volatility.
74 A Decentralized Model
In this section we study a decentralized version of the model. We assume
that a representative worker/￿rm takes the real wage as given and chooses
capital, unemployment and vacancies to maximize expected utility. To close
the model we introduce three alternative solution concepts to determine the
real wage.
In the ￿rst concept we adopt the idea that competition between market
makers forces the wage to maximize the expected utility of potential workers,
that is, the wage is chosen to implement the social planning optimum. We
compare this solution with an alternative, suggested by Hall [10], in which
the real wage is unresponsive to current market conditions. We implement
this solution by assuming that the real wage is that which would prevail along
the non-stochastic balanced growth path. Since the ￿xed wage solution leads
to ￿ uctuations in unemployment and vacancies that are too volatile relative
to the data, we also consider a third equilibrium concept in which the real
wage adjusts partially each period towards its optimal value.
4.1 Setting up the agent￿ s problem
The decentralized economy is populated by a unit measure of households
who optimally choose labor e⁄ort LS, search e⁄ort U, and capital holdings
K to maximize utility and operate the production technology for which they
choose employment of labor LD, search e⁄ort V , and the amount of capital
to rent from households. We assume markets exist that allow households to
perfectly share consumption risk. The solution to this decentralized problem
is equivalent to the solution of the problem of a representative agent who
acts both as a household and as a ￿rm.
In his role as a household, the agent supplies labor LS













￿ b(Ut + Vt)
￿
and labor supply in period t is related to search e⁄ort Ut and lagged labor
supply by the expression
L
S






8￿ Mt=￿ Ut is the increase in employment when the household increases its search
intensity, Ut, by one unit. This probability is parametric to the household,
but is determined in equilibrium as the ratio of aggregate matches ￿ Mt to
aggregate search intensity ￿ Ut.
The representative worker/￿rm faces the following sequence of budget
constraints;3













t ￿Ct: t = 1;:::
(10)
The household can increase its stock of workers, LD
t by incurring a utility
cost ￿bVt of search. Every additional unit increase in Vt leads to an increase
in the stock of employed workers of ￿ Mt=￿ Vt where ￿ Vt is aggregate search
intensity by all other ￿rms and ￿ Mt is the aggregate number of matches. This
leads to the following expression
L
D






for the accumulation equation faced by the household in its role as a labor
demander.
4.2 Solving the agent￿ s problem















taking as given the production function (3) and the accumulation constraints














3Although we have modeled an economy with a single asset, storable capital, nothing of
substance would be added by including a complete set of contingent claims markets. Since
this is a representative agent economy, additional markets would serve only to determine
the prices for additional assets at which the representative agent would choose not to
trade.
9The ￿rst order conditions for the choice of time spent searching in his capacity








































t ; ￿ Ut = Ut; ￿ Vt = Vt;
and by the de￿nition of the aggregate matching function





Using these market clearing conditions and the de￿nition of tightness, in







































Since there are two ways of moving labor between leisure and employ-
ment, but only one price, the model as it stands is missing an equilibrium
condition. Typically, a model of this kind would be closed by adding a Nash
bargaining equation to ￿x the real wage, Wt. The Nash bargaining solution,
for appropriate choice of bargaining weights, can be shown to implement the
social planning solution.4 Alternatively one might appeal to Moen￿ s idea of
4The generalized Nash bargaining solution divides the surplus of a match in proportion
to an exogenous bargaining weight. For the case of a Cobb-Douglas matching function,
this solution implements the social planning optimum when the bargaining weight is equal
to the elasticity parameters ￿ of the matching function. This result is a generalization of
the Hosios condition [14] to a model with more general utility functions.
10competitive market makers to argue that the wage will be chosen to maxi-
mize the expected utility of the representative worker. In either case, the
imposition of the e¢ cient solution leads to a wage equation of the form
Wt = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
Yt
Lt
+ (1 ￿ ￿)Ct￿L
￿
t: (17)
Combining Equation (17) with the equilibrium conditions and the ￿rst-order
conditions of the competitive model, Equations (13) and (14), one arrives at
equations for unemployment and vacancies that mimic the ￿rst-order condi-
tions of the social planner, Equations (4) and (5).
In the following analysis we will study three di⁄erent equilibrium con-
cepts. In the ￿rst we choose the wage according to Equation (17) to mimic
the social planning optimum. We also consider a ￿xed wage equilibrium in
which we allow the real wage to grow at the underlying rate of growth of
the economy but we do not allow it to respond to productivity shocks. In
the third equilibrium concept we allow the real wage to adjust each period
by a fraction ￿ of the way back towards the e¢ cient solution in each period.
The equations that de￿ne the wage are explained more fully in Section 5.2
after we de￿ne a set of stationary variables that allow us to ￿nd approximate
solutions to our model.
5 Computational Issues
This section describes the procedure that we used to compute the properties
of equilibria in the arti￿cial economy. We begin by describing the solution
algorithm that we used to compute the properties of arti￿cial time series
generated by the model. We then describe the alternative wage determination
mechanisms that we used to close the model.
5.1 The Solution Algorithm
To compute solutions to the model we used a second order approximation
to the policy function due to Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe [24]. Their proce-
dure requires that the variables be separated into a set of non predetermined
variables pt and a set of predetermined variables qt. To implement this pro-
cedure, one must ￿rst ￿nd a representation of the model in which all of the
variable are stationary.





















; lt = log(Lt);






















The vector qt consists of the predetermined variables
qt = fat;kt;lt￿1;wt￿1g;
and the vector of nonpredetermined variables, pt is given by
pt = fyt;ct;ut;vt;zt;jtg:
We assume that all uncertainty arises from stochastic productivity shocks
that take the form
at+1 = ￿at + ￿"t+1
where "t+1 s N (0;1) and is independent across time and ￿ is the standard
deviation of the innovation to the productivity shock. The model is a set of
equations
Etf (pt+1;pt;qt+1;qt) = 0; (18)
where the function f consists of identities, model de￿nitions and ￿rst-order
conditions. These equations are de￿ned in Appendix A.
5.2 Alternative wage determination mechanisms
To compute the decentralized solution under alternative wage determination
mechanisms we solved for the time path of wt in the social planning optimum.






yt￿lt + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)e
ct￿lt￿
:
12Next we computed the steady state value ￿ w;
￿ w = log
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿e
y￿l + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)e
c￿l￿
:
To compute alternative equilibria we simulated sequences for a set of equa-







By setting ￿ = 1 this solution implements the social planning optimum.
Alternatively, setting ￿ = 0 and choosing an appropriate initial condition
￿xes the wage equal to its unconditional mean along the balanced growth
path. Choosing any other value of ￿ in the interval (0;1) implements a
partial adjustment mechanism in which the logarithm of the real wage adjusts
a fraction ￿ of the way towards the social planning optimum in any given
period.






= h(qt;￿) + ￿￿"t+1;
where ￿ is the standard deviation of the shock "t and ￿ is the column vector
￿ = [1;0;0;0]
0 :
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe provide code that generates analytic ￿rst and sec-
ond derivatives of the function f in Equation (18).5 Evaluating these deriv-
atives at the point
￿ p = g (￿ q;0); ￿ q = h(￿ q;0)



































5The exact relationship between these expressions and the Schmitt-GrohØ-Uribe code
is explained in Appendix B.
13The terms
~ qt = (qt ￿ ￿ q); ~ pt = (pt ￿ ￿ p)










are bias terms that cause ~ pt and ~ qt to di⁄er from zero when the model is
nonlinear. The variable
~ mt = ~ qt ￿ ~ qt ￿ vec(~ qt~ q
0
t)
is a vector of cross product terms.
The Schmitt-GrohØ-Uribe solution has a number of advantages over al-
ternative algorithms. First, it uses the symbolic math feature of Matlab to
compute analytic derivatives of a user speci￿ed set of functions. This fea-
ture mechanizes the process of solving for derivatives by hand and removes
a potential source of error. Second, the program computes a second order
approximation to the policy function which is essential if one is interested in
a welfare comparison of alternative wage determination mechanisms.
6 Taking the model to the data
This section describes the procedures we used to pin down key parameters
of the model. We begin by describing parameters that are in common with
standard RBC models and move on to describe some novel features that arise
from our version of a search model of the labor market.
6.1 Standard features of the calibration
Table 1a lists the values of six key moments that we used to calibrate para-
meters.











Average ratio of consumption
to gdp 0:75
ls Labor￿ s share of gdp 0:66
￿ Autocorrelation of TFP 0:99
￿" Standard deviation of TFP 0:007
Since the arti￿cial economy is based on a Solow growth model, the para-
meter g which represents the quarterly growth rate of technological progress
is equal to the quarterly per capita growth rate of gdp. This was set at
0:0045 which implies an annual per capita growth rate of 1:8%, equal to the
U.S. average for the past century. To calibrate the elasticity of capital in
production;￿, we used the assumptions of competitive labor markets and
constant returns-to-scale which imply that ￿ is equal to 1 ￿ ls, where ls is
labor￿ s share of gdp.
To compute the time series properties of the productivity shock we com-









We regressed the log of TFP on its own lagged value and computed the ￿rst
order autocorrelation coe¢ cient and the standard deviation of the residual.
This led to values of ￿ = 0:99 and ￿" of 0:007:
The procedure for solving for the steady state levels of output, consump-
tion, capital and the parameters ￿ and ￿k relies only on the steady state
resource constraint and capital Euler equation and is identical to the pro-
cedure followed in a standard RBC model. This is a consequence of the
fact that the friction introduced in the labor market distorts decisions only
as the economy transitions from one state to another and is inconsequen-
tial in a nonstochastic economy in steady state. To compute the quarterly
15depreciation rate we solved the steady state equations,




(g + ￿K)ky = 1 ￿ cy; (22)
for ky, the steady state capital to gdp ratio and ￿K, the depreciation rate as
functions of r, ￿; g and cy. Equation (21) is a no-arbitrage relationship in
the asset market and (22) is the steady state gdp accounting identity.
The unknowns r and cy were set equal to their historical averages in the
data; we set r = 0:0162 which represents an annual rate of 6:6% (computed as
the average annual yield on the S&P 500) and cy = 0:75, which is the average
ratio of consumption to gdp when government consumption is included as






which gives a value of ￿ = 0:99. Table 1b lists the values for the parameters
￿, ￿K and ￿, implied by this exercise.









for physical capital 0:0314
￿ Elasticity of capital in production 0:34
6.2 Labor market parameters calibrated from the steady
state
We now turn to features of our model that di⁄er fromstandard RBC economies.
Table 2a lists some of the moments from data and parameter values that were
used to calibrate the labor market portion of the model. We set the sepa-
ration rate, ￿L, at 10% per quarter based on Shimer￿ s [25] interpretation of
16the JOLT data, the unemployment rate at 5:8%; and the participation rate
to equal 70%.
Table 2a:
Labor Market: Parameters chosen to match moments







p Average participation rate 0:7
￿ Inverse labor supply elasticity 0
￿





To pick the parameter ￿ we used the fact that real business cycle mod-
els require high labor elasticity to generate su¢ cient volatility of hours. In
the base-line calibration we picked ￿ = 0 which has become standard fol-
lowing Hansen￿ s work [13] on indivisibilities. Finally, we set ￿ according to
Blanchard and Diamond￿ s [3] estimated value of ￿ = 0:4.
The steady state values of U and L are related to the unemployment rate









Since the model contains a single representative agent, we normalized the
population size to 1 and computed L and U from Equations (23) and (24).
This led to a value of L = 0:66; and U = :041 which implies that the
representative agent spends 66% of his time in paid employment and 4:1%
searching for a job.
To pin down steady state vacancies, new matches and the parameters B
and b we used the labor market ￿rst order conditions and the de￿nition of
the matching function. In the steady state, the number of new matches must
equal the number of jobs destroyed exogenously each period which implies,
m = ￿LL: (25)
17From the steady state versions of Equations, (15) and (16), and noting
that the steady state wage w is given in terms of known quantities by the
steady state version of (17) we can solve for b and V as functions of ￿
b =
w=c ￿ ￿L￿


















In the following table, b and V are calculated for ￿ equal to 1:204, a value
that we explain in the following section. The steady state values associated
with the labor market are collected in table 2b.








Fraction of time searching
for workers :051
L Fraction of time working 0:66
b Disutility of search e⁄ort :83




6.3 Labor market parameters associated with the volatil-
ity of unemployment and vacancies
There are two important parameters of the model that are not pinned down
by the steady state calibration; these are ￿, a parameter that governs the
disutility of work and ￿, the degree of wage rigidity. The labor market
dynamics of the model are highly sensitive to the joint choice of these pa-
rameters and they were calibrated to match several stylized facts regarding
the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies.



























Figure 1: Model statistics for di⁄erent values of lambda
Figure 1 plots the variances of unemployment and vacancies and the cor-
relations of each with GDP for di⁄erent values of ￿ holding ￿xed ￿ at 1:204.
Figure 2 plots these same variables against ￿ holding ￿ ￿xed at 0:19. To
select the values 1:204 and 0:19 we searched over a grid of these parameters
and chose values that came close to matching these four moments. This ￿g-
ure illustrates the point that when ￿ = 1, (the social planning solution) U
and V are both positively correlated with gdp and hence a model like this
one with highly elastic search intensity cannot explain the Beveridge curve.
Figure 2 shows how the correlations of U and V with gdp depend on ￿.
Notably, these correlations switch sign as ￿ increases above 1:325 and for
values above 1:26 ￿ becomes negative. This singularity when ￿ approaches
1:26 is present for all values of ￿ 2 [0;1]. These ￿gures make transparent the
way in which the imposition of some degree of wage rigidity breaks the one to
one correlation between U and V that obtains in the ￿ exible wage economy.
We conclude that both the volatilities and correlations with GDP of the key



























Figure 2: Model statistics for di⁄erent values of chi
labor market variables, U and V , are highly sensitive to the disutility of labor
￿ and to the speed of wage adjustment ￿.
7 Matching the Data
We now turn to the performance of our model in certain key dimensions
by comparing two di⁄erent calibrated economies with the U.S. data. Table
3 reports the volatilities and correlations with gdp of gdp, consumption,
investment, hours worked, labor productivity, the real wage, unemployment
and vacancies. The ￿rst column reports the moments of the quarterly data
from 1955 ￿rst quarter, to 2002, fourth quarter. Consumption and investment
are both de￿ned as the sum of private plus government components and all
variables are in 1996 U.S. dollars and de￿ ated by U.S. resident population.
Hours is de￿ned as employment per person multiplied by average hours where
20employment is total non farm employment from the establishment survey.
Productivity is gdp de￿ ated by hours and the real wage is computed as
compensation to employees divided by hours and de￿ ated by the 1996 gdp
price index. Unemployment is the U.S. unemployment rate for persons over
16 years old and vacancies is an index of help wanted from the St. Louis
Federal Reserve data base. All variables have been passed through the HP
￿lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
The second two columns of Table 3 report the same moments for two
arti￿cial economies. The middle panel is an economy in which the parameter
￿ is set equal to 1 which allows the wage to adjust each period to a value that
causes the decentralized solution to mimic the social planning optimum. The
third panel reports data for an economy in which the log of the real wage
adjusts by a fraction 0:19 towards the social planning optimum wage level in
any given period.
Table 3
Standard deviations in percent (a) and correlations



















































































































21Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 were generated by simulating 100 runs of the
model for the baseline parameters setting ￿ = 1 for column 2 and ￿ = 0:19
for column 3. We refer to the former as a ￿ exible wage economy and to
the latter as a sticky wage economy. The disutility of labor ￿ = 1:204 was
chosen together with the wage ￿ exibility parameter ￿ = 0:19 to match the
four model moments described in the previous section to the corresponding
sample moments in the data. For comparison purposes, we set ￿ = 1:204
in both calibrations. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of
the reported variable over 100 simulations. In each case, the column labeled
(a) reports the standard deviation of a variable and the column labeled (b)
is its correlation with gdp. All arti￿cial data has been passed through the
HP ￿lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 in the same way as the real
world data.
There are two features of Table 3 that are important. Notice ￿rst, that
gdp, consumption investment and hours have the same statistical properties
in the ￿xed wage and the ￿ exible wage economies. In each case the corre-
lations with gdp and the standard deviations of these series are within one
standard deviation of each other. The reasons for the di⁄erences of these sta-
tistics from the U.S. data are, by now, well understood and the model does
not add much that is new in this dimension.6 The ￿xed and ￿ exible wage
economies di⁄er substantially, however, in their predictions for the behavior
of unemployment and vacancies.
In the data the standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies are
equal to 11:57 and 13:00. Vacancies are procyclical with a correlation co-
e¢ cient with gdp of 0:9 whereas unemployment is countercyclical with a
correlation coe¢ cient of ￿0:86. In the social planning optimum, in con-
trast, unemployment and vacancies each have a standard deviation of 5:91,
they are perfectly correlated with each other and correlated with gdp with
a coe¢ cient of 0:40: Contrast this with the sticky-wage arti￿cial economy.
Here, unemployment has a standard deviation of 11:43 and vacancies has a
standard deviation of 13:67. As in the U.S. data, these variables are nega-
tively correlated with each other. Vacancies is procyclical with a correlation
coe¢ cient with gdp of 0:81 and unemployment is countercyclical with a corre-
lation coe¢ cient with gdp of ￿0:72. We conclude that the sticky wage model
does a reasonably good job of matching the labor market facts without com-
6For example, investment is too smooth in our simulated environment. This is typically
addressed by adding a cost of adjustment to the model.
22promising the ability of the model to explain gdp, hours, consumption and
investment.
Although our model performs well in some dimensions its behavior with
respect to the real wage and productivity is disappointing. By adding an
additional shock to the model we might hope to reduce the model implications
that productivity and gdp are strongly correlated whereas the correlation in
the data is much weaker. The model also has counterfactual implications for
the correlation between the real wage and GDP although this may partly
depend on the timing of our labor adjustment equation. We assume that
new workers can immediately contribute to gdp whereas a more standard
assumption is to impose a one-period delay. We plan to explore this issue in
future research.
8 Welfare Costs of Sticky Wages
If the sticky wage economy does a good job of replicating the real world data,
one might ask the question: What is the di⁄erence in welfare between the
￿ exible wage equilibrium and the equilibrium with sticky prices? To answer
this question, we computed a second order approximation to expected utility
for values of ￿ ranging from 0 to 1. When ￿ = 0, the wage grows each period
at the rate g, but is unresponsive to innovations in the technology shock. For
our calibrated value ￿ = 0:19, the wage adjusts each period by 19% of the
di⁄erence between its previous value and the optimal wage for the period.
We follow Lucas [15] and calculate the welfare cost of a sticky wage regime
parameterized by ￿ as the fraction of consumption an agent would give up
each period in return for moving to the wage regime ￿ = 1. To formalize
this, de￿ne the expected utility of an agent in an economy parameterized by



























































where the superscript ￿ refers to the state contingent allocations in the sticky
wage economy and superscript SP refers to the social planning allocation.
23The welfare cost of living in an economy with wage stickiness, which we






























Since the period utility function is additively separable and logarithmic in
utility we obtain the following expression for   (￿) in terms of the di⁄erence
in expected lifetime utility between the two regimes








We used the Schmitt-GrohØ-Uribe algorithm discussed above to obtain an
approximate di⁄erence equation describing the evolution of lifetime utility
jt over time. That the approximation is second order accurate is especially
important in the welfare calculation as in a ￿rst order approximation the
certainty equivalence property would obtain. Figure 3 plots the welfare cost
for di⁄erent values of ￿ with all other model parameters ￿xed at the values
tabulated in the calibration section.
We are most interested in the welfare cost in the economy where the
degree of wage stickiness, ￿, delivers plausible movements of unemployment
and vacancies over the business cycle, which we argued is the economy where
￿ = 0:19. While there is still a welfare loss in this economy, we found it to
be much less than in the fully rigid case. The representative agent would be
willing to give up 0:0071% of consumption each period in order to live in the
￿ exible wage economy. This is roughly $0:40 per person per quarter which is
a relatively small number. This suggests that relatively low unmodelled costs
of rapid wage adjustment, menu costs for instance, could serve as a plausible
explanation for equilibrium wage stickiness. On the other hand, when wages
are made completely sticky the welfare cost is 0:37% of consumption or $20:86
per person per quarter, a number that would require much higher costs to
justify.
9 Conclusion
We have shown that a relatively simple modi￿cation to a standard real busi-
ness cycle model, of the kind initially studied by Andolfatto and Merz, cannot
easily explain the properties of unemployment and vacancies in the U.S. data.










Figure 3: The welfare cost of sticky prices
The problem with this model is the one identi￿ed by Shimer: unemployment
and vacancies are not volatile enough and they have the wrong correlation
with gdp. We modi￿ed the model using Hall￿ s suggestion that a model with
rigid wages may provide a better representation of the data. As pointed
out by Hall, the rigid wage model does not leave ￿rms or workers with an
incentive to change their behavior, in e⁄ect, because the search model has a
missing market.
Although the rigid wage model does better in some dimensions than the
￿ exible wage economy, it overshoots on unemployment volatility and leads
to gdp ￿ uctuations that are too small. An intermediate model in which
the real wage adjusts by 19% of the way each quarter towards the ￿ exible
wage solution, does a much better job. This model performs as well as the
standard RBC model at capturing the volatility of hours, gdp, investment and
consumption. In addition it captures the observed volatility of unemployment
and has close to the correct volatility for vacancies. More important, we ￿nd
25that unemployment is countercyclical and vacancies are procyclical, just as
they are in the U.S. data.
We compared the welfare properties of alternative equilibria and found
that the rigid wage solution is associated with a welfare cost of roughly $20:86
per person, a relatively large number. The partial adjustment equilibrium,
on the other hand, is associated with a welfare cost of only $0:40 per quarter.
This suggest that there may some small unmodelled cost of wage adjustment
that is missing from the model, but which causes the sticky wage equilibrium
to dominate, at least for ￿ uctuations of the magnitude that we have observed
in the post-war period.
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29Appendix A: The function f
Production Function







￿ct+1(1 ￿ ￿K + ￿e
yt+1￿kt+1): (A2)
Gdp accounting identity
f3 = (1 + g)e





f4 = at ￿ ￿at￿1: (A4)
Utility function de￿nition
























Vacancy ￿rst order condition
f7 = e








￿ (1 ￿ ￿L)e
￿(vt+1￿ut+1): (A7)


















￿ut+(1￿￿)vt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿L)e
lt￿1: (A9)
30De￿nition of productivity
f10 = zt ￿ yt + lt: (A10)
31Appendix B
The Schmitt-GrohØ-Uribe code generates arrays hx;hxx;h￿￿;gx;gxx and
g￿￿. The arrays gxx and hxx are three dimensional and may be unpacked into
ten 4￿4 and four 4￿4 matrices respectively. The second order approximation
in matrix form can then be written as follows
~ pt = g￿￿￿














~ qt+1 = h￿￿￿














where ~ qt is 4 ￿ 1 and ~ pt is 9 ￿ 1. Using Kronecker product notation and the
fact (see Hamilton [?] page 265) that
vec(ABC) = (C






qq~ qt) = ~ q
0














qq~ qt) = ~ q
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and ￿q = h￿￿￿2; ￿p = g￿￿￿2 leads to the expressions
~ pt = ￿p + gq~ qt + Gqq ~ mt; (B9)
~ qt+1 = ￿q + hq~ qt + Hqq ~ mt; (B10)
which corrspond to equations (19) and (20) in the text.
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